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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: FISHER GOES ON THE
QUINTESSENTIAL FISHING EXPEDITION
AND HUBBELL IS OFF THE HOOK
H. RICHARD UVILLER"
I must confess that what first drew me to the Supreme
Court's decision last term in the case against Webster Hubbell'
was not the celebrity of the protagonist, but the Court's para-
phrase of the position of Judge Williams, dissenting in part at
the circuit level.2 As Justice Stevens for the Supreme Court re-
counted it:
In the opinion of the dissenting judge, the majority failed to give
full effect to the distinction between the contents of the documents and
the limited testimonial significance of the act of producing them. In his
view, as long as the prosecutor could make use of information contained
in the documents or derived therefrom without any reference to the fact
that respondent had produced them in response to a subpoena, there
would be no improper use of the testimonial aspect of the immunized
act of production. In other words, the constitutional privilege and the
statute conferring use immunity would only shield the witness from the
use of any information resulting from his subpoena response "beyond
what the prosecutor would receive if the documents appeared in the
grand jury room or in his office unsolicited and unmarked, like manna
from heaven."3
This opinion states precisely how I have taught the law of
implicit self-incrimination by compliance with a subpoena duces
tecum-the so-called "act of production" extension of the "testi-
monial or communicative" boundaries of the Fifth Amendment
Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
2 United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Circuit Judge Wil-
liams dissenting from Part II of decision).
3 Hubbeg 530 U.S. at 34.
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monial or communicative" boundaries of the Fifth Amendment
"privilege."4 Ever since the progenerative case, Fisher v. United
States, was decided in 1976,5 I have carefully explained to bewil-
dered students that the Fifth Amendment "privilege" can be as-
serted against a subpoena duces tecum only in the rare case where
the prosecutor proposes to use the evidence of compliance with
the subpoena as inculpatory in itself." Seizing a document and
making evidentiary use of the information it contains-directly
or indirectly-may be a violation of the Fourth Amendment
right to security in your papers and effects, but it is not a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. Being compelled to produce a
document by subpoena duces tecum-even a highly personal and
incriminating document that you composed yourself-is not
what is meant by being compelled to be a witness against your-
self.
What drew my attention to the Hubbell decision was the fact
that my clear understanding of the Fisher doctrine is exactly
what was rejected by the Supreme Court, and by the nearly
unanimous vote of 8-1. It is a small comfort to know that the
ChiefJustice (and he alone) thought thatJudge Williams had it
just right.
7
What is at stake here is an obscure-if not exotic-extension
of the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to assist in
one's own conviction, with implications for the immunity doc-
trine, and substantial impact on the government's use of the
subpoena to explore the documentary byways that may lead to
criminal charges. A bit of background may be useful.
I put "privilege" in quotation marks because, as an evidence teacher, I regard the
word asjuro-slang when applied to the Fifth Amendment shield. To my lights, this
clause of the Fifth Amendment accords a right not to be compelled to incriminate
oneself, not a "privilege." Immunity, substituted for the lost right, might be desig-
nated a privilege. So too we might regard the effects of an exclusionary remedy as a
privilege in disguise. But the exalted precept of the Amendment itself establishes a
right. The case that established the "testimonial or communicative evidence" bound-
ary of the Fifth Amendment right was Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761
(1966), as discussed below.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
6 To appreciate just how esoteric this doctrine is, understand that, since the Fifth
Amendment "privilege" is "personal," collective entities (such as corporations) have
no recourse to the claim that compliance with a subpoena is implicitly inculpatory.
See generally United States v. Braswell, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
' ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented wholly on the basis of the dissenting opinion
ofJudge Williams in the court below. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44.
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It was, of all people, Justice William Brennan who articu-
lated the principle by which severe boundaries have been drawn
on the Fifth Amendment doctrine of compelled self-
incrimination.8 Back in 1966, ten years before Fisher was de-
cided, Brennan announced in Schmerber v. California that the
Fifth Amendment "privilege" meant that one could not be
compelled to be a "witness" against oneself only in the sense of
providing, under duress, "testimonial or communicative evi-
dence."9 He quoted Justice Holmes, who rejected a Fifth
Amendment objection to forcing a person to model a blouse.'
In the quotation chosen by Justice Brennan, Holmes said the
theory of the objection called for "an extravagant extension of
the Fifth Amendment," and went on to say "[T] he prohibition
of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compul-
sion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of
his body as evidence when it may be material."" In other words,
as Brennan described the "privilege," no one can be forced to
divulge cerebral evidence, to speak the contents and products of
the mind. Here's how Justice Brennan expressed the principle
in Schmerber
[T]he privilege has never been given the full scope which the values it
helps to protect suggest. History and a long line of authorities in lower
courts have consistently limited its protection to situations in which the
State seeks to submerge those values by obtaining the evidence against
an accused through "the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from
his own mouth." .. [The privilege is a bar against compelling "com-
munications" or "testimony," but that compulsion which makes a suspect
or accused the source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it.'2
From this emphasis on evidence pried from the clamped
jaws of a potential defendant, one might have thought that the
production of a previously-made document under compulsion
of court order (though its contents be autobiographical and its
' SeegenerallySchmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
9Id. at 761.
"Id. at 763 (quotingHolmes' opinion in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245.252-53
(1910)).
" Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763. In a rather neat phrase (though baffling to some),
Holmes once put it this way: "A party is privileged [by the Fifth Amendment] from
producing the evidence but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228
U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
12 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762-64.
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import be inculpatory) is of no concern to the Fifth Amend-
ment. Like any other physical evidence, the document may be
produced by compulsion so long as it was not created by com-
pulsion. But it should be remembered that the evidence at is-
sue in Schmerber was blood, forcibly extracted for chemical
analysis of alcohol content.3 It was not a document, and Bren-
nan was careful to note that while, as Holmes had held before
him, the Fifth Amendment "privilege" does not protect the body
or its fluids, it may apply to past and recorded expressions of the
mind. 4 Thus, he wrote (with one of those exasperating claims
to clarity): "It is clear that the protection of the privilege
reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they
might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also
communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to
produce one's papers."' 5
Brennan's initial exemption for written communications
(not compelled communications when made, but surrendered
under compulsion of subpoena) made sense. Indeed, there are
some, including the concurring Justices in Hubbell, to whom it
still makes sense." A priori, and ignorant or dismissive of con-
trary judicial precedent, one might easily be tempted (along
with my students) to believe that being compelled (by court
process or otherwise) to furnish previously-expressed cerebral
evidence that might be used in securing a conviction violates
the explicit terms of the Fifth Amendment: not to be compelled
to be a witness against oneself.
But Justice Brennan did not rely on intuition. He had re-
spected authority for his inclusion of recorded declarations in
the category of testimonial evidence compelled from the wit-
ness' own mouth. He relied exclusively on an old and venerable
case called Boyd v. United States.'7 That case, decided in 1886,
"Id. at 759.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 763-64 (citingBoyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
16 In a rather startling concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, with Justice Scalia, ex-
pressed his opinion that the Schmerber construction of the scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment protection fails to accord with the historical record. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49
(ThomasJ. and ScaliaJ., concurring). A bit more on this opinion anon.
7Boyd, 116 U.S. 616. Boydwas not the first case in which the Supreme Court dealt
with the compelled rendition of self-incriminating documents. Professor Nagareda
reminds us of a dictum written over fifty years before Boyd in which the Court said
that a witness "could not have been compelled to produce the commission (the sub-
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held that the Fifth Amendment "privilege" and the rights to se-
curity under the Fourth Amendment overlapped, such that in-
vasions of privacy might at the same time amount to compulsory
self-incrimination. In one of its most frequently quoted pas-
sages, the Court in Boyd wrote: "[W] e have been unable to per-
ceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be
used in evidence against him is substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself."' 9
Brennan's allocation of the Fifth Amendment "privilege" to
the realm of "testimonial and communicative" evidence has en-
dured; his Boyd exception has not. Boyd itself was shot down
more than once, only to rise again like a Phoenix.)° However,
unless Hubbell has stirred new life in the creature, several cases
have corrected Brennan's initial take on the status of freely re-
corded verbal evidence. And today, or until Hubbell, I think
most commentators would be willing to say unequivocally (with
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor)2' that documents are more like
body fluids or the keys to the padlock than they are like live tes-
timony or the padlock's memorized digital code.2- Perhaps the
poenaed document] and thereby furnish evidence against himself." Richard A. Na-
gareda, Compulsion to Be a Witness and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L RE%. 1575,
1584-85 (1999) (quoting United States v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. 352, 366-67 (1832)). Ac-
cording to Professor Nagareda, this is the first time the Court put the common law
principle in constitutional terms. Id. at 1585.
'8 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. Perhaps the strongest statement of this overlap is the fol-
lowing:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the tw.o amendments The)
throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned
in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to
give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amend-
ment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." which is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unrea-
sonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
9 1d.
" How can one resist calling a case named Boyd a Phoenix when it rises from its
own ashes?
2 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Samuel A. Alito, Documents and die Pzriilege Against Self-Incrzmnation, 48
U. Prrr. L REv. 27, 78 (1986) (finding that "the Fifth Amendment privilege simply
does not address the problem of subpoenas for existing documents.. . ."); Robert P.
Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fiflt Amendment Senously, 73 V,!. L RE%'.
1, 17-18 (1987) (accepting the basic holding of Fisher); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Seif-Incrimination Clause, 93 MIcH. L RE%.
857, 920 (1995) (recognizing the distinction between requiring a suspect to "hand
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factual backdrop of the Hubbell drama should be painted in at
this point to set the scene. Then I will attempt to flesh out these
esoteric doctrines to see whether the Court has distorted the
fragile distinction or incurred any pragmatic grief.
In the fall of 1994, Kenneth Starr, the Independent Counsel
(IC hereafter), was investigating the financial affairs of the
Whitewater Development Corporation, and more particularly
the possible involvement of President Clinton therein. Out of
this investigation came an indictment against presidential
friend, Webster Hubbell, for mail fraud and tax evasion arising
out of the billings of his Arkansas law firm. In December 1994
he pleaded guilty and received a sentence of twenty-one
months. As part of the plea agreement, Hubbell undertook to
cooperate in the Whitewater investigation. In October 1996,
while Hubbell was doing his time, the IC served him with a sub-
poena calling for the production of documents in eleven cate-
gories before the Little Rock grand jury. When Hubbell
appeared before the grand jury the following month, he as-
serted his privilege against self-incrimination. He did not as-
sert the privilege because the contents of the documents might
be inculpatory, but rather on the contention that the act of
compliance with the subpoena itself might have adverse penal
consequences. He also refused on the same ground to answer
questions about whether he had documents answering the de-
scription in the subpoena within his custody or control.
The government, prepared for this move, immediately pro-
duced a previously obtained court order directing a response,
and granting such immunity as allowed by law. Hubbell there-
upon produced over 13,000 pages of documents, and re-
sponded to questions to the effect that these were all the
documents in his possession answering the subpoena's descrip-
tion, save a few exempted by attorney-client privilege. The con-
tents of these documents furnished material that enabled the IC
to bring a second prosecution, the case under discussion here.
This indictment charged various tax-related mail and wire
frauds in ten counts. The District Court dismissed it on the
over incriminating words or things already in existence" and "obliging him to be a
witness").
" We don't have the cooperation agreement, but it seems a bit odd at the outset
that the government had to proceed by subpoena and tolerate a motion to quash
when the usual arrangement with a cooperating witness is simply to put the obligation
of full disclosure in the contract itself.
[Vol. 91
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ground that it violated the statutory immunity granted Hubbell
because all the evidence either "directly or indirectly derived
from" the testimonial aspects of respondent's "immunized act"
of producing those documents.24 Terming the subpoenas "the
quintessential fishing expedition," Judge Robertson noted that
the IC had admitted that he had no interest in tax matters when
he issued the subpoena, but had learned about the unreported
income from reading the records produced.z
The Court of Appeals vacated the order of dismissal and
sent the case back to the District Court. The minuscule differ-
ence of opinion comes to this: the District Court (according to
the Court of Appeals) had emphasized the prior ignorance of
the IC regarding the contents of the documents, rather than
their existence and authenticity or the respondent's possession
and control of them. The IC would have learned of these mat-
ters from their production alone. If the Court of Appeals accu-
rately read Judge Robertson's order,26 this result seems the
correct application of Fisher. On remand, however, the District
Court was directed to determine "the extent and detail of the
government's knowledge of Hubbell's financial affairs (or of the
paperwork documenting it) on the day the subpoena issued."-'
This, they said, would reveal the extent that the government
made use of the act of production in "building its case."
Apart from its impossibly fine distinction between the con-
tents and the existence of documents, the position of the major-
ity of the Court of Appeals seems simply wrong. As I shall
attempt to explain more fully below, the existence of the papers
as a fact standing alone was of no significance; it's no crime to
write or keep financial records. Nor was the custody or authen-
2' United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 34, 36 (D.D.C. 1998), red 167 F.3d
552 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affd 120 S. Ct 2037 (2000). The court also dismissed on the
ground that "The charges in the indictment neither relate to nor arise out of the sub-
ject of the original grant ofjurisdiction to the independent counsel, and the referral
order under which the independent counsel is proceeding impermissibly expands
that jurisdiction." Id at 27. That basis for dismissal, however, vas reversed and evi-
dently dropped; it was not before the Supreme Court.
2d. at 37.
2 The district court opinion is not crystal clear on this point. Judge Robertson
writes: "The independent counsel concedes that he built hzs case against Mr. Hubbell
using 13,120 pages of records that Mr. Hubbell was compelled to produce under sub-
poena." Id at 27 (emphasis added).




ticity of the documents the issue; this was not a crime of posses-
sion, nor was Hubbell's compliance with the subpoena likely to
be evidence of provenance or of Hubbell's knowledge of or in-
volvement in the tax fraud. Hence, it must have been the con-
tents of the manna from heaven that enlightened the IC and
propelled the investigation to the point of indictment. The
question of how much the IC knew before he saw the papers
(or, as the court puts it, before he issued the subpoena) is the
same question as how much he learned about this matter from
what he read in the papers-their contents. The question on
remand, then, will result in the same answer as the question
deemed error the first time around.28
On remand, the IC conceded that he could not demon-
strate, as the Court of Appeals demanded, "a prior awareness
that the exhaustive litany of documents sought in the subpoena
existed and were in Hubbell's possession."' Hubbell thereupon
entered a conditional plea of guilty subject to the Supreme
Court's view of the reach of the immunity. The Supreme Court
obligingly granted the IC's petition for certiorari. 0
Affirming the Court of Appeals, Justice Stevens, for the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, obviously accepts the government's
dual arguments: (1) that only the existence, authenticity, and
custody of the documents are attested by compliance with the
subpoena duces tecum; and (2) that the government does not
propose to use the fact of compliance directly to prove any of
28 The dispositive question as framed by the court would not have pleased the Edi-
tors of the Harvard Law Review who wrote, in 1982, "the extent to which mere pro-
duction conveys information is not altered by the depth of the government's [prior]
knowledge." Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: the
Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARv. L. REv. 683, 687 (1982). It's a point
worth pondering. The locus of the "privilege" does not generally depend upon the
extent to which its violation advances the government's cause. The introduction of a
coerced confession (or illegally seized evidence, for that matter) is as repugnant in an
otherwise overwhelming case as in a weak one.
Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 581.
The "plea agreement" actually provided for dismissal of all charges against
Hubbell unless the Supreme Court held that the act-of-production immunity "would
not pose a significant bar to his prosecution." United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct.
2037, 2038 (2000). Whether, in an "ordinary case," the Supreme Court would have
deigned to answer the question put to them by the plea agreement-indeed, whether
the Solicitor General would have put the question to them-is subject to doubt. In any
event, the Court found that the case is not moot since a reversal with an opinion suf-
ficiently favorable to the government will result in a sentence (not involving incar-
ceration). See id. at 2046-48.
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those facts. Yet the Court finds that indirect use was "abun-
dantly clear," supplying a "lead to incriminating evidence," a
"link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute."3' Such use
would violate the immunity accorded to the full extent required
by law since immunity adequate to overcome the Fifth Amend-
ment "privilege" must include insulation of the products of the
compelled evidence. That much has been clear since the an-
cient case of Counselman v. Hitchcock,32 which first accepted im-
munity as a constitutionally adequate replacement for the lost
"privilege," specifically on condition that future use of the indi-
rect products of compelled testimony be precluded.3
So the question in Hubbell becomes, just how did the gov-
ernment use the inferences from the act of compliance indi-
rectly? Such indirect use is not inconceivable. What if an
Assistant U.S. Attorney approached a reluctant witness and per-
suaded him to give evidence by telling him, "When we asked for
them, Web brought in 13,000 pages of documents from his files;
how can you say he knew nothing about these matters?" The re-
sponse, offered as evidence against Hubbell,3 would surely be
excluded as fruit. Not having exhibited the documents or told
the potential witness what they contained, it could not be said
that the prosecutor procured the secondary evidence by use of
the contents of the primary; it was obtained by exploitation of
the privileged act of production.
But that sort of clear, derivative use was not the present sce-
nario. Where, then, did Justice Stevens and company find the
clearly established, secondary gain from the Fisher-type self-
inculpation? 5 Stevens emphasizes the "undeniable" value to the
government of the "catalog of existing documents fitting within
" Id. at 2046.
32 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
' This was also the decision that was universally misread for eighty years to require
"transactional" immunity (true immunity against future prosecution) until the nation
,was set straight by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
I assume, of course, that the response inculpating Hubbell, either repeated
from the witness stand or otherwise exempt from the rule against hearsay, was other-
wise admissible.
' The purist might note here that it is somewhat odd for the Supreme Court to
make findings such as these. What the government knew, how they learned it, and
whether and to what extent the cataloging provided by Mr. Hubbell was of assistance
in preparing his prosecution, are normally the sort of factual determinations that are
made by trial judges upon remand.
2001]
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any of the eleven broadly worded subpoena categories. ' 6 The
"accurate inventory" of potential sources of incriminating evi-
dence landed on the prosecutor's desk through the cerebral ef-
forts of the defendant, Hubbell . Furnishing this rich lode of
pre-sorted tips, the Court reasoned, was like answering a series
of detailed interrogatories utilizing the "contents of his own
mind., 31 "The assembly of those documents," the Court be-
lieved, "was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall
safe, not like being forced to surrender the key to a strong-
box. 09
The problem with this reasoning is that it goes too far. Vir-
tually every custodian who complies with a subpoena duces tecum,
must use his or her mind to sort out the files and to cull and or-
ganize documents. The process of recognition and the implicit
voucher of authenticity-attesting, in effect, that these are the
items answering the description in the subpoena-are, of course,
the predicates of Fisher. But Fisher precludes only the use of the
inculpatory inference itself (here displaced by the immunity).
The facilitation of understanding from an organized catalogue,
like the discovery of the substantive crimes from the facts re-
corded in the documents, is not really a secondary gain from
the compelled act of production; it is simply drawing inferences
from contents. It hardly seems "anemic ' to argue that Fisher
forbids the use of inferences from the "physical act" of produc-
tion only, and not from the contents of the items produced."
The majority calls a prohibited secondary gain the receipt of
"the incriminating documents of which it made 'substantial use
... in the investigation that led to the indictment."4 2 Here and
elsewhere, Stevens appears to say that the derivative use that vio-
lated Hubbell's immunity consisted of the intelligence the
documents contributed to the development of the case against
$" United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2046 (2000).
17 Id. at 2047. It should be noted that, except for the intolerable burden and dis-
ruption alluded to as Fourth Amendment grounds for quashing a duces tecum sub-
poena, the effort required to cull and sort records has never been a factor in
weighing the constitutionality of enforced compliance.
Id. (citations omitted)
39 Id." Id. (Justice Stevens' characterization).
41 id.
'2 Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct.
2037 (2000) (No. 99-166)).
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Hubbell. Let us hope that he does not mean that having seen
the neatly organized reams of documentary evidence of defalca-
tion, the IC was more than ever determined to make the second
case against Webster Hubbell. Derivative use cannot include
the subjective impact on the prosecutor of the documents pro-
duced. The confirmation of suspicion and the enhancement of
motivation are the normal byproducts of even the most securely
immunized compliance with any subpoena. 3
In any event, the Court's description of the prohibited "de-
rivative use" comes perilously close to treating the contents of a
document as the indirect product of its production. And this
approach confuses Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and
hints at a rebirth of the thoroughly discredited and deeply in-
terred Boyd doctrine. This poses a nice dilemma between un-
thinkables: either the Fifth Amendment "privilege" forbids
compelling self-incrimination by the compulsory surrender of
inculpatory evidence (or at least documents), or the "privilege,"
which insulates direct use of the implicitly inculpatory aspects of
the fact-of-production, offers no protection against the use of its
indirect products, in defiance of Counselman v. Hitchcockh.
The only way to avoid the grim doctrinal consequence of
applying the right against compelled self-incrimination to the
inculpatory contents of subpoenaed documents is twofold.
First, the Counselman injunction must be modified in this appli-
cation to make it clear that the only secondary gains prohibited
by Fisher are those procured by the express use of the fact of
compliance alone-without reference to the contents, their or-
dered presentation, or their surprising import-much as in the
simple paradigm I offered a while back. Then we might deal
with the intuitive offensiveness of wanton probes-the quintes-
sential fishing parties-by beefing up the Fourth Amendment.
The privacy concerns implicit in the security of "papers," to
which that Amendment is addressed, suit it admirably for the
task. All that is required is for the Court to declare that private
records have unique features of sanctity such that a search for
them by subpoena is unreasonable per se. They must be
' To be sure, the grand old classic, Silverthorne Lumber Company, Inc. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), on its own terms, appears to hold that the fruit of the
poisonous tree includes the effect that illegally-obtained documents has on the pur-
poses of the prosecutor. But in the voluminous citations to that case as the progeni-




sought, if at all, by warrant. That means the defendant must
show some advance probable cause that they exist and that they
are in the location specified. Moreover, they must be described
with some particularity, though there is precedent for treating
this requirement liberally."
There is one example I can think of where the Court has ac-
tually taken a category of seizure out of the reasonableness
clause and insisted it could be lawfully made only in obedience
to the warrant clause. This is the seizure of a person by arrest.
In Payton v. New York the Court noted that although one's secu-
rity in his person did not preclude a seizure on probable cause
(or, in some circumstances, a temporary detention on less' 9)
without a warrant in open spaces. However, the Court stated
that when a person goes into his home, that security interest is
amplified by the specially-sanctified privacy interests of the en-
closure. 6 Thus, the Court held an indoor arrest (and certainly
an at-home arrest), even on ample cause, is unreasonable with-
out an arrest warrant (the equivalent of a search and seizure
warrant for a live body).
Actually, Payton lays down a serviceable footprint in the vir-
gin snow. Some acquisitions are so grievously destructive of
firmly-held notions of individual integrity that ordinary consid-
erations of reasonableness will not suffice. This is especially
true when reasonableness standards are as loosely relaxed as
they are in the case of a search by subpoena. Imposing the re-
quirements of prior description and probable cause comes
closer to answering the concerns of the Hubbell Court than un-
persuasive applications of the doctrine of secondary gains from
implicit compelled self-incrimination.
The suggestion that searches for and seizures of certain
"private" or "personal" papers be shifted into the warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment will cause no undue alarm in many
prosecution investigations. It is axiomatic that we don't nor-
mally seek inculpatory documents by subpoena duces tecum.
Charging the fox with the responsibility of delivering the chick-
ens, feathers intact, to the grand jury does not seem the wisest
course. But considerable consternation can be expected from
" See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
45 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
46 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
" Id. at 590, 603.
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those prosecutors engaged in the typical broad-ranging, open-
ended exploratory investigation.
The point to be emphasized is, of course, that-until now-
there has been nothing wrong with prosecutorial expeditions
that fish for evidence of crime with subpoenas duces tecum. In-
deed, prosecutors-and the grand juries they lead-are supposed
to go fishing. They are supposed to enlighten themselves by the
product of their subpoenas. There is no requirement that they
know what they will get before they ask for it. However, there is
a strict constitutional requirement that they know exactly what
they are looking for before they go into private space by warrant
to look for it. But the subpoena rules differ in precisely that re-
gard. While the duces tecum is a Fourth Amendment event, the
requirement of an advance, particular description is relaxed
considerably. The only constitutional limitation on the search
by subpoena is that it not be hopelessly broad or severely bur-
densome. If compliance would require the production of virtu-
ally all the records of a business, or if the burden of sorting
through the records would nearly bring the ordinary operation
of the business to a halt, the subpoena is invalid. Maybe the
confusion is in the use of the metaphor "fishing expedition."
The term is used to characterize the vague or over-inclusive
subpoena, but it is defined as I have just done. It is not defined
as the District Court did in Hubbel, as a subpoena calling for
documents the contents of which reveal the unsuspected details
of the custodian's crimes.
Now, it might be that the Hubbell subpoena was overbroad
in its description of the documents in the eleven categories, or
that it would have been unduly burdensome for Hubbell to
comply (particularly from his prison cell), but there seems to
have been no claim on those grounds; Hubbell had the thirteen
thousand pages ready to hand over when immunity was ac-
corded him.
While the Chief Justice's dissent relies entirely on the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Williams in the Court of Appeals, Jus-
tice Thomas, with Justice Scalia concurring, signal their
willingness to reconsider Brennan's circumscription of the am-
bit of the Fifth Amendment "privilege." They detect a "substan-
tial body of evidence" that would extend the coverage of the
privilege to potentially inculpating "evidence" of all sorts, not
just "testimony." Nor do they propose to revise only the post-
Schmerber error. They contend that the historical record would
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extend the privilege not only to recorded products of the mind,
but the compelled production of any evidence. 8 A "witness" in
the true constitutional sense of the word is "one who gives evi-
dence"-evidence of any kind.49 The support Thomas and Scalia
cite for their proposition is found in dictionaries and judicial
opinions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Moreover, they say, the eighteenth century common-law privi-
lege against self-incrimination protected against compelled
production of physical and documentary evidence of all sorts.
With a long, scholarly exegesis on the original meaning of the
"privilege," they issue a warm invitation to the bar to afford the
Court a future opportunity to remake some basic constitutional
doctrine-with devastating effect.
This highly unusual preview of the disposition of two Jus-
tices, addressed to an abstract question, may be historically
sound and logically persuasive, but it is difficult to imagine that
these two venturesome Justices can convince at least three col-
leagues to overrule Schmerber and find that the painless extrac-
tion of blood (or breath, for that matter) from an unwilling
driver to test for alcohol content, or the direction to don a criti-
cal garment, is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. Even the
proposition that a subpoena summoning inculpatory private
papers, freely made, makes the messenger into a "witness" is a
hard sell at this juncture in our doctrinal development.'o
48 United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct 2037, 2050-54 (2000) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
'9 Professor Nagareda, whom Justice Thomas cites, advances a similar line of ar-
gument. He contends that in contemporary eighteenth century usage "to be a wit-
ness" was interchangeable with "to give evidence." Moreover, undisputed common
law at the time of the founding forbade the compelled production of self-
incriminatory documents. See Nagareda, supra note 17, at 1615-24. Although he does
not dispute the Court's correction of Justice Bradley's misunderstanding of the
Fourth Amendment to forbid as "unreasonable" the seizure of self-inculpatory docu-
ments, he does accuse the Court of having "thrown out the Fifth Amendment baby
with the Fourth Amendment bath water." Id. at 1581. Specifically, he commends to
the Court the view that "compelled production of self-incriminatory documents inde-
pendently violates the Fifth Amendment, even though the seizure thereof would be
permissible under the Fourth." Id.
'0 This is the very task that Professor Nagareda has taken on himself. Rejecting
Fisher's logic, he argues "[tihe fundamental distinction is between the compelled giv-
ing of self-incriminating evidence to the government (categorically impermissible
under the Fifth Amendment) and the unilateral taking of such evidence by the gov-
ernment (permissible, when done in compliance with the Fourth)." Id. at 1581.
While this restructuring might have the advantage of forcing a higher degree of ad-
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Fisher, on which the Hubbell Court relies, was explicit on the
ways in which compliance with a subpoena duces tecum might
implicitly communicate a fact that could be used against the re-
sponding custodian5 Justice Byron White, writing for the
Court, set forth just how the act of production might itself be
incriminating testimony. He wrote:
The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena neverthe-
less has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents
of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by
the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers
are those described in the subpoena. [Citation omitted.] The elements
of compulsion are clearly present, but the more difficult issues are
whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both "testimonial" and
"incriminating" for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. These
questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their
resolution may instead depend on the facts and circumstances of par-
ticular cases or classes thereof. In light of the records now before us, we
are confident that however incriminating the contents of the account-
ant's workpapers might be, the act of producing them-the only thing
which the taxpayer is compelled to do-would not itself involve testimo-
nial self-incrimination. It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the exis-
tence and possession of the papers rises to the level of testimony within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment.5
vance specification and good reason (i.e., "probable cause") for invasion seeking ma-
terial of this nature, it puts an odd-and unwarranted-constitutional stress on passivity.
The difference, after all, between a search and a subpoena has little to do with the
twin constitutional concerns of "security" and "compulsion," but rather with the dif-
ference between active and passive cooperation in the unwilling surrender of material
from a zone of preferred privacy. Urging the "rehabilitation" of the discredited Boyd
doctrine, Nagareda ignores the fact thatJustice Bradley not only misunderstood the
scope of the Fourth Amendment right to security, but the restriction of the Fifth to
cognitive or cerebral evidence, the special concern with a person's sovereignty over
the contents of his mind, in contrast with entitled security in places and things.
" Professor Heidt fairly notes that the Court, in expounding its implied admission
rule in the subpoena context ignores other situations where compelled compliance
with law carries a self-inculpatory implication. For one (as Justice White acknowl-
edged), providing a handwriting exemplar implicitly communicates that the person
can write and that the writing is his normal script. For another, Heidt cites United
States v. Byers, 402 US 424 (1967), upholding a California statute requiring a person
involved in an automobile accident to give his name and address at the scene. See gen-
eraly, Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents: Cutting Fisher's Tan-
gled Line, 49 Mo. L. REv. 439 (1984).
2 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976). For a nicely drawn portrait
of Fisherand its antecedents, see generaUy, Nagareda, supra note 17.
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So Justice White took pains, in creating this extension of the
privilege, to specify-and thereby to limit-its application. He
conceived of three, and only three, ways that the act of compli-
ance might itself be testimonially incriminating: attesting to the
existence of the papers called for, the fact that the person sub-
poenaed has them, and that they are, in the belief off the per-
son subpoenaed, the very papers described in the subpoena.
He goes on to note (1) that however incriminating the contents,
their compelled production does not trouble the Fifth Amend-
ment; and (2) that it is doubtful that merely admitting the exis-
tence and possession of the documents rises to testimonial self-
incrimination.53
In my view, therefore, the words of the Court that created
the act-of-production privilege attaching to the subpoena duces
tecum are very close to the words of dissent by Judge Williams of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent. Any use of the
subpoenaed documents breezes by the Fifth Amendment "privi-
lege," save only the use of the fact of compliance itself as proof
of guilt. There is no suggestion whatever in Hubbell that the
Court believed that such use would be made, nor did they re-
mand (or approve of the remand) to discover whether such use
was contemplated. Rather, the Court, and the court below,
wanted to know whether the prosecutor learned anything that
he didn't know before from reading the subpoenaed docu-
ments. If so, then impermissible derivative use, in contraven-
tion of the immunity granted, was made of the subpoenaed
documents. To me, this seems plain wrong.
Another way to look at the issue in Hubbell is in terms of
immunity: Was the prosecution (the second prosecution) of
Webster Hubbell precluded by the immunity granted him in ex-
change for the thirteen thousand pages he turned over? The
extent of the immunity, remember, was coyly stated as whatever
he is entitled to by law. This timid phraseology is the govern-
ment's raft out of a turbulent part of the river, but it is also a
way of informing the target-witness that he will receive only the
minimal statutory protection rather than the more generous
contractual immunity which the government reserves for its
most important (and reluctant) cooperators. The government
can-and regularly does-enter written agreements with flipped
53 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-14.
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defendants by which the government agrees, and binds itself, to
drop pending charges or to forego prosecution in exchange for
truthful assistance. This is old-fashioned "transactional," or
"true," immunity. But it is more than the government need of-
fer to strip the imperiled target of his asserted constitutional
protection against incriminating himself. In Kastigar v United
States,5 the Supreme Court corrected a longstanding misappre-
hension in state and federal courts: to override an assertion of
"privilege," all that is necessary is a replacement for the lost pro-
tection, and that is adequately provided by a guarantee that the
truthful, compelled evidence will not be used directly or as the
source for other evidence in a future prosecution of the person
who surrenders it. This is so-called "use immunity." Shortly af-
ter this intelligence came down, the federal government and
most states trimmed back their immunity statutes to grant use
rather than transactional immunity. Thus, the immunity law in-
volved in Hubbel4 18 U.S.C. section 6002, provides that when-
ever a witness asserting the "privilege" is ordered to respond,
the witness must do so, but "no testimony of other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indi-
rectly derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prose-
cution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing
to comply with the order.""
One critical caveat is missing from this simple paradigm.
The reluctant witness cannot withhold merely damaging or em-
barrassing testimony by "taking the Fifth"; only the potentially
inculpatory may be withheld. And the command that over-
comes the "privilege" confers immunity only to the extent that
the disclosed information was within the entitlement of silence
in the first place. On this point, section 6002 is not as clear as it
might be, stating that: "Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis
of the privilege against self-incrimination . . .." This seems to
imply that immunity is in the hands of the witness; all she need
do is assert the constitutional basis for her refusal and whatever
she is ordered to reveal is outside the government's reach
thereafter. Not so. Immunity covers only what the "privilege"
covered. The assertion of the "privilege" that triggers the im-
munity must be a valid assertion, that is, the answer to the ques-
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2000).
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tion might actually incriminate or furnish a lead to something
incriminating.56 So the immunity question becomes indistin-
guishable from the rights question: did the prosecutor "use" the
material which Hubbell was constitutionally entitled to with-
hold?
As I have said, I think not. The "use" that the Court finds
"abundantly clear" (rendering remand unnecessary) was the
new understanding that the IC gleaned from the neatly cata-
logued papers that was helpful in developing the case against
Hubbell. These are, of necessity, matters contained in the pa-
pers, not the fact of their production. And the contents of a
writing, not itself produced by coercion, are without the protec-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. No "privilege," no immunity.
Since Webster Hubbell was not entitled to withhold the infor-
mation contained in the papers, he was not immune to the use
against him of those contents, insofar as they informed the IC of
what he did not know independently.
Of the several perplexing-and disturbing-features of this
strange opinion, two stand out. The first is the murky sugges-
tion that the Phoenix, Boyd v. United States, may be rising again
from the ashes of its many burials. The other is the implication,
unnoticed by the Court (none of whom ever investigated or
tried a criminal case), for the future use of investigative sub-
poenas in the development of subterranean cases of fraud, cor-
ruption, or financial mismanagement.
Undeniably (as I have noted), there is something appealing
about Justice Bradley's thesis in the Boyd case, even today, to
many people aside from Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall. We do sympathize, viscerally, with the idea that private
records and papers should not be subject to invasion by warrant
or compulsory process in the same way that other physical evi-
dence is."s Whether this exemption be called an area of per-
"' Before the overriding order that penetrates the "privilege" and confers the im-
munity is issued, the witness' refusal may be taken before ajudge for a ruling on the
validity of the assertion.
7 See, eg., Nagareda, supra note 17 (concluding that the proper treatment of sub-
poenas "requires one to abandon the reasoning of Fisher and to resurrect the Fifth
Amendment holding of Boyd.") See also Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REv. 343 (1979).
' Even Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1967), which eliminated the ex-




sonal security immune even to the Fourth Amendment warrant
process, or a special variety of compelled self-incrimination
which offends the Fifth Amendment "privilege," seems a matter
of little moment. Obedient to this instinct, the Boyd Court
comes to its "overlap" doctrine and the notion that protected
privacy is violated by the compelled production of one's own
words, albeit in recorded form. Reminding the Bar of Lord
Camden's 1762 judgment in the famous case of Entick v Caring-
ton, Justice Bradley issues this much-quoted aphorism:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his draw-
ers, that constitutes the essence of the offence [to liberty and security);
but it is the invasion of the indefeasible right of personal security, per-
sonal liberty, and private property.... In this regard the fourth and fifth
amendments run almost into each other.'
Justice Bradley also adverts to a law passed by the First Con-
gress in 1789 providing that courts shall have the power to com-
pel the production of books and records containing evidence,
but only subject to the rules of chancery. One "elementary" fea-
ture of those rules, Justice Bradley informs us, "is never to de-
cree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of a
crime, or to forfeit his property."w
So the attraction of Boyd seems to be this: Self-inculpatory
words spoken under compulsion, which emanates either from
interrogation or the process of the subpoena ad testi ficandun, do
not seem intuitively so different from words spoken or written
freely but produced under compulsion of the subpoena duces te-
cum. AndJustice Thomas and his co-signor have promised, with
a rich foretaste, to fortify that intuition with solid scholarship.
But despite the pull of this century-old case, it has not set
the course for navigating between the principles of the Fourth
and the Fifth Amendments. The Boyd Court's inability to distin-
guish the invasion of privacy by unlawful search and seizure
from the compelled disclosure of inculpatory facts ultimately
doomed the case. Security in person and place has nothing
whatever to do with freedom from government coercion. The
search warrant allowed by the Fourth Amendment is, by its na-
ture, coercive. It authorizes a coercive (in the sense of non-
consensual) invasion of secure places. And what may be law-
s9 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
6o Id at 631.
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fully-seized includes papers along with other incriminating ma-
terial. On the other hand, the area protected by the Fifth
Amendment right cannot be penetrated by process, however
strong the probable cause or particular the description; the
cognitive process can only be penetrated by the substitution of
fully compensatory immunity. So, prevalent thinking would
have it that the two Amendments do not "run almost into each
other." They diverge sharply to protect in different ways two
very different aspects of personal security and autonomy. And
in that distinction, the difference is clear between the personal
paper protected by the Fourth Amendment, not against forced
surrender, but against arbitrary invasion of its locus and baseless
deprivation of its corpus, and, in contrast, the mind of the sus-
pect protected by the Fifth against any form of curtailment of
volitional control.
Perhaps the coup de grace was delivered to the old Boyd
doctrine by Justice O'Connor, concurring in United States v.
Doe,1 where she wrote:
I concur in both the result and the reasoning of Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court. I write separately, however, just to make explicit
what is implicit in the analysis of that opinion: that the Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of
any kind. The notion that the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of
papers originated in Boyd v. United States, but our decision in Fisher v.
United States sounded the death knell for Boyd. "Several of Boyd's express
or implicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time[,]" and its pri-
vacy of papers concept "had long been a rule searching for a rationale..
.." Today's decision puts a long-overdue end to that fruitless search.
62
But, as Justice O'Connor notes, it was Fisher, assisted by a
case called Andresen v Maryland,63 both decided in 1976, that de-
finitively brought the reign of Boyd to a close." In Andresen, Jus-
tice Blackmun squarely presented the question as follows: "The
question, therefore, is whether the seizure of these business re-
61 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984).
"' Id. The Editors of the Harvard Law Review had so concluded two years earlier.
They wrote: "Because no more compulsion is involved in producing personal papers
than in producing other evidence, the self-incrimination clause can no longer be
used to exclude private papers from production." Note, The Rights of Criminal Defen-
dants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath ofFisher v. United States, 95 HARV.
L. REy. 683 (1982).
63 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
' See also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988),
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cords, and their admission into evidence at his trial, compelled
petitioner to testify against himself in violation of the Fifth
Amendment."6 To support an affirmative answer, petitioner re-
lied on the language of Boydjust quoted.6 Blackmun and the
rest of the Court simply were not pursuaded. They looked back
only a few months to Fisher v. United States, and quoted their own
authority as follows:
[A]n attorney's production, pursuant to a lawful summons, of his
client's tax records in his hands did not violate the Fifth Amendment
privilege of the taxpayer "because enforcement against a taxpayer's law-
yer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything-and certainly
would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself. -
7
Andresen, to be sure, laid a strange emphasis on the fact that
the acquisition of evidence had been by search, compelling the
defendant to do nothing, much less to say something incrimi-
nating. That unfortunate and repeated point invites the distinc-
tion between search (a passive endurance) and subpoena
(compelled active cooperation). Of course, all the Court was
trying to do was to recognize its own recently created doctrine,
and allow that with a subpoena, unlike a warrant, there is a pos-
sibility the at the act of compliance may be, in itself, communi-
cative. But one should avoid the temptation to say that though
Boyd may be dead for acquisitions by warrant, it lives where the
duces tecum compels production.
In 1984 the Supreme Court handed down aJohn Doe case
devoted exclusively to the Fifth Amendment aspect of a sub-
poena duces tecum for documents."9 With copious quotations
from Fisher, Justice Powell wrote for the Court,
As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment protects the person as-
serting the privilege only from compelled self-incrimination [citing
Fisher]. Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no com-
pulsion is present. A subpoena that demands production of documents
'does not compel oral testimony;, nor would it ordinarily compel the tax-
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 471.
He also relied on Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), a case nearly as famous as
Boyd, which I need not discuss here.
7 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 472.
' United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
"' Id. at 607, n.3. The court made this point because they evidently saw a possible
Fourth Amendment problem with the subpoenas which were very broadly drawn.
They noted that that issue, however, was not before them.
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payer to recite, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the docu-
ment sought' [citing Fisher again] 
70
So, disagreeing with the Court of Appeals (and making a
point of the disagreement) ,71 the Court finds: "The fact that the
records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to the de-
termination of whether the creation of the records was com-
pelled. We therefore hold that the contents of those records
are not privileged., 72 On the issue of the act of compliance, the
Court apparently reluctantly accepts the District Court finding
that the act of producing the documents would involve implicit
testimonial self-incrimination as a matter of fact. They unwisely
decline to allow de facto immunity, and note that the govern-
ment never pursued the statutory course for bestowing immu-
nity.7 3 However, they could have done so. The Court is careful
to note that had they done so, "the Government ... could have
compelled respondent to produce the documents listed in the
subpoena.
7 4
The message is clear: there was no significance in the ap-
parent stress the Court laid in Andresen on the fact that acquisi-
tion by search warrant compelled the defendant to do nothing;
nor is the passivity of the defendant significant in cases like
Fisher, where a subpoena duces tecum is addressed to third par-
ties. The Fifth Amendment simply does not apply to acquisition
of documents by subpoena except in those few instances in
which the act of production has evidentiary value in itself. In
such instances, the grant of formal immunity, as was done in
Hubbell, completely overcomes any possible Fisher problems.
And Boyd, of course, is totally out of the picture.
7' Id. at 610 (citingFisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
7, Id. at 617, n. 18.
72 Doe, 465 U.S. at 612. For nit pickers, the fact that the records were in respon-
dent's possession might distinguish the case from Fisher, where the records were in
the hands of a third party: the lawyer.
7 I think it unwise because, in the normal course, when constitutionally shielded
communication is obtained without fully compensating immunity the evidence is un-
usable. Not called "use immunity," the exclusionary consequence is indistinguishable
from it (possible civil remedies aside). So it could have been said that the prosecu-
tion simply bears the burden of showing that neither the implicit communication of
compliance, nor any fruits thereof, were used as evidence. It's not the prosecutors
propective promise that he will not, it is a demonstration that he hasn't, that removes
the Fisherstain.
7' Doe, 465 U.S. at 614.
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So, despite the many efforts to extinguish the Boyd doctrine,
one of the disturbing characteristics about the Hubbell decision
is that it sends a faint and subtle suggestion that the Phoenix
may be stirring in her ashes yet again. The opinion comes close
to saying outright that the contents of Hubbell's documents
were protected by immunity and hence by the Fifth Amend-
ment against the IC's use to enlighten himself. In other words,
the telltale contents of the freely recorded documents, such as
inculpatory testimony, can not be forcibly pried from the hands
of its custodian. This reading of the Hubbell message, which is
hopefully erroneous, implies a substantial doctrinal shift.
This troubling suggestion remains subtle, however, because
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, knows and readily recog-
nizes the lesson of Fisher, Andresen, and Doe. Likewise, the major-
ity obviously cannot be wooed by Thomas' promise to reinvent
the bounds of the "privilege" starting from scratch (i.e., before
Schmerber). Thus, Stevens writes: "More relevant to this case is
the settled proposition that a person may be required to pro-
duce specific documents even though they contain incriminat-
ing assertions of fact or belief because the creation of those
documents was not 'compelled' within the meaning of the pri-vi-
lege."75 But the bottom line, as the Court sees it, is not "whether
the response to the subpoena may be introduced into evidence
at his criminal trial." That would violate the immunity granted.
Rather, the question is "whether [the Government] has already
made 'derivative use' of the testimonial aspect of that act" in ob-
taining the indictment and preparing for trial. Clearly the
Court finds it has.76 Specifically, "it is undeniable that providing
a catalog of existing documents fitting within any of the eleven
broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor
with a 'lead to incriminating evidence' or 'a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute."'7 "It is abundantly clear that
the testimonial aspect of respondent's act of producing subpoe-
naed documents was the first step in a chain of evidence that led
to this prosecution. "7"
The case, then, comes down to the extremely subtle, if not
metaphysical, question of whether the information used by the
' United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000).
76 Id. at 2046.
77 Id. at 2039.
73 Id. at 2046.
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IC, the "catalog," was the unprivileged contents or the privi-
leged contents of the mind of Webster Hubbell, revealed in his
act of compliance. Is the government's contention that all that
Hubbell did was physically and non-testimonially furnish the
documents truly "anemic" as the Court would have it? Or is the
Court's view correct that by turning over hundreds of docu-
ments, and implicitly attesting to their character, Hubbell lent
his testimony to the IC's development of the case against him,
such that the prosecution itself was "derived" from the com-
pelled act of production?
It is my concern that looking to the understanding, factual
enrichment, or motivation of the prosecutor as the product of a
witness' act of compliance with a subpoena calling for docu-
ments will take us far beyond Fisher's modest application of the
"privilege" to the delivery of physical evidence. If claiming the
right to hold personal papers immune from compulsory process
on Fifth Amendment grounds takes root, I can see the ghost of
Boyd dimly materializing as "privacy" is once again asserted as
an adjunct of the right to be free of testimonial compulsion.
Finally, the Hubbell decision is disturbing for the threat it
poses to the free-ranging grand jury investigation of official cor-
ruption, financial crimes, and other frauds. These are cases in-
volving a lot of paperwork, or the electronic equivalent. Close
examination of documents and other records is essential to the
detection of the crime and for fixing any criminal responsibility.
Without the records, prosecutors and their accountants might
never get a handle on the transactions or figure out the situs of
criminal agency. In other words: no documents, no case. And
typically the precise paperwork or the contents of the electronic
files is not known with great particularity in advance, making it
difficult to obtain a search warrant. The investigative method of
choice and necessity is the subpoena duces tecum. Without it, the
grand jury is helpless.
The crimes I have in mind are often buried and corrosive
ventures where the prosecutor and the grand jury have little
more than a hunch to direct their attention in the first instance.
Perhaps investigation starts on a defection, a half-suspect accu-
sation by a former associate or co-conspirator; only enough to
justify a closer look. Maybe a suspicious discontinuity in some
neighboring transaction raises a prosecutorial eyebrow. An un-
explained windfall, an undeserved preference, any number of
barely perceptible events and circumstances may cue the alert
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prosecutor that further curiosity might be fruitful. That closer
look is obtained by subpoena duces tecum. To call the inquiry
with an uncertain scope, an unclear focus, and perhaps an uni-
dentified culprit, pejoratively a "fishing expedition" defeats the
value of investigative enterprise.
If the custodian produces documents that confirm suspi-
cion, enlarge the knowledge of the investigators, and implicate
the custodian himself as the criminal entrepreneur, the Hubbell
decision seems to say the whole case might go down as the fruit
of a violation of the right not to be compelled by process to
communicate inculpatory evidence. Whenever a broadly-
worded, frankly inquisitive subpoena arrives in the hands of a
nervous custodian of the records, she may reply not only by
making a weak Fourth Amendment objection that the duces te-
cum is overbroad and oppressive, but by claiming that to bring
in the requested material would help the prosecution, and will
therefore violate the Fifth Amendment right not to do so. If
that claim can succeed and the court will not simply dismiss it as
a thinly disguised effort to privilege the contents of records, the
investigatory powers of the grand jury will be severely curtailed.
I'm quite certain that is not what Justice White had in mind
when he wrote Fisher.
To recapitulate, I find the Supreme Court's decision in the
case against Webster Hubbell troubling because, having rejected
the correct understanding of the Fisher doctrine expressed by
the dissenting judge below, the majority directs the remand of
the case to determine a question that goes well beyond what
Fisher requires and comes dangerously close to allowing the
Fifth Amendment "privilege," and the immunity coterminous
therewith, to shield the contents of freely written documents.
As Judge Williams, dissenting below, correctly said, the majority,
and now joined by the Supreme Court, failed to give fair weight
"to the distinction between the contents of the documents and
the limited testimonial significance of the act of producing
them." Not only is such a failure doctrinally offensive, the
pragmatic implications for future exploratory investigations are
dire.
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